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Today organizations are using computers to support material areas of their activities:
controlling warehouses, assisting in production design, controlling vital processes,
improving clerical productivity as well as traditional accounting. Most o f these computers
store the data necessary for their activity in the form of databases. Therefore, the issue of
database security is increasingly a matter of concern to all organizations. An organization
needs to ensure that its valuable data is not exposed to unauthorized individuals or
corrupted by hostile parties. The goals in database security relate to how well the system
achieves these security goals, and the relationship between mechanisms provided by the
operating system and those provided by the database system, and architecture o f a secure
Database Management System. This paper is a result of research on Database System
Security. The security properties that need to be considered during the definition and
design phase of a Database System are detailed. A modeling, technologies and
methodological framework for security system development in Database Systems is
summarized. As a Database Administrator working on an Oracle Database Management
System in a software company, I feel that database security is essential to ensure system
continuity and reliability and to protect data and programs from intrusions, modifications,
theft and unauthorized disclosure. This paper also includes some research on a real
Database Security System: the Oracle Database Security System. Issues involving the
Oracle database security system in practice include establishing an organization’s
security policy and plan, protecting system files and users’ passwords, controlling access
to the database objects including tables, views, rows, columns, packages, building
appropriate user roles, privileges and profiles, developing appropriate backup and
recovery strategies, etc.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Overview
Today organizations are using computers to support material areas of their

activities: controlling warehouses, assisting in production design, controlling vital
processes, improving clerical productivity as well as traditional accounting. Most of these
computers store the data necessary for their activity in the form of databases. Database
Management Systems (DBMSs) and the database technology have been largely used for
these purposes.
A database is a collection o f physical datafiles and DBMS software that
manipulates the data [21]. Although the increasingly widespread use of both centralized
and distributed databases has proved that the databases are very important to support
business functions, it has also posed the serious problem of data security. On an almost
daily basis, we hear stories of computer systems that have been damaged by someone - a
curious teenager, a disgruntled employee, or a corporate or political spy. We are baffled
and bemused by the number o f “hackers” who have been able to get into system that have
been viewed as invulnerable. For example, government computers, bank accounting
systems, and university systems should not be compromised by hackers. But, all of these
kinds o f systems have been compromised by hackers. It would appear that no computer
system is completely safe. In fact, damage in a database environment does not only affect
a single user or application but rather the whole organization or the whole information
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system. Therefore, in computer-based information systems, technologies, tools and
procedures concerning security are essential both to ensure system continuity and
reliability and to protect data and information from intrusions, modifications, theft and
unauthorized disclosure. The issues of database security are increasingly a matter of
concern to all such systems.
There are many facets to computer security. These aspects o f security include
security and confidentiality; accuracy, integrity and authenticity; availability and
recoverability [20J.
•

Ensuring security and confidentiality means that data should not be disclosed to
anyone who is not authorized to access it. For example, the patient’s medical records
are confidential and should not be improperly disclosed.

•

Ensuring accuracy and integrity means that data cannot be maliciously or accidentally
corrupted or modified. Ensuring authenticity means providing a way to verify the
origin of the data. For example, in a military environment, the target coordinates of a
missile should not be improperly modified.

•

Ensuring availability and recoverability means data can be recovered efficiently and
completely without loss o f accuracy or integrity in case of loss, and the systems can
keep working. For example, in a commercial environment, payment orders regarding
taxes should be made on time as fixed by law. Analogously, in a military
environment, when the proper command is issued, the missile should fire.
The goals in database security relate to how well the system achieves security

goals, the relationship between the security mechanisms provided by the operating
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system and those provided by the database system, and the architecture of a secure
Database Management System.

1.2

Proposal
The goal of this project is to do research on Database System Security. The

security properties that need to be considered during the definition and design phase of a
Database System are detailed. The security control (flow control, inference control and
access control), the security models (discretionary security models and mandatory
security models), and technologies for security system development in Database Systems
are summarized. As a Database Administrator working on an Oracle Database
Management System in a software company, I feel that database security is essential to
ensure system continuity and reliability, and to protect data and programs from
intrusions, modifications, theft and unauthorized disclosure. Another goal of this project
is to do research on a real Database Security system: the Oracle Database Security
System. Issues involving the Oracle database security system include:
•

Establishing an organization’s security policy and plan;

•

Protecting system files and users’ passwords;

•

Controlling access to the database objects;

•

Building appropriate user roles, privileges, views and profiles;

•

Developing appropriate backup and recovery strategies.
This paper will include five chapters. Chapter 1 illustrates the importance of

computer database security in many organizations, the facets of database security, and the
necessity o f doing research on this area.
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In Chapter 2, the database management system, data description levels and
relational data model are briefly described. The security problems (improper release of
information; improper modification of data; denial of service; natural or accidental
disasters; errors or bugs in hardware or software, and human errors) are examined in this
chapter. After examining the existing security problems, the database security protection
requirements (integrity; authorization; inference; access control; and confinement) are
discussed here. Then, the structure of a Database Management System including the
security features is presented. The basic security models for security controls including
access control, flow control and inference control are also described and classified in this
chapter.
After analyzing the main desirable criteria and requirements, the development
process for secure database systems is illustrated in Chapter 3. The policy plan for
designing a secure Database Management System is discussed and presented. The basic
security models are described and classified in this chapter. First, the elements of DBMS
security models are illustrated. Then, several specific security models (The Wood Model,
The Dion Model, and The RBAC96 Model) are presented in this chapter. The security
models are classified in two traditional categories: discretionary security models and
mandatory security models.
As a Database Administrator working in a company using Oracle software, I am
doing research on the Database Security and Oracle Security system implementation as
part of my current daily work. Chapter 4 describes the security in an Oracle database
system including the main files and database objects of special significance to Oracle
security, for example, privileges, views, default roles, user accounts, profiles, password
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and synonyms. This chapter also illustrates the specific steps to build a secure Oracle
database system. The development of a security plan and an audit plan is explained in this
chapter. This chapter also discusses the specific strategies for starting up Oracle and
backing up and restoring Oracle databases in the most secure manner.
Chapter 5 is the conclusion of the research paper. It summarizes the research
effort. The future research directions of Computer Database Security are briefly discussed
here. These include the application of computer immune systems to the distributed
database systems and the design of multilevel secure database systems.
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Chapter 2
Database Security and Models
2.1

Database Management System
A database is a collection o f mutually correlated data stored on persistent storage

supports [21]. The database refers not only to the physical data but also to the
combination of physical, memory and process objects. It is used within an organization
by different applications, each one having its own business functions and purposes. In a
database, data (entity) and data associations (relationship) that characterize an application
are described.

2.1.1 Concepts of Database Management System
A Database Management System (DBMS) is a software system which includes a
set o f data management functions. The DBMS manages a three-level structure and its
necessary interface. The three-level structure includes the conceptual level, the internal
level and the external level. Great quantities of data can be accessed rapidly and
efficiently through the schema management, concurrent transaction management, data
access controls, logging, and recovery of the database. These functions are very useful for
both the database and the application management. The Entity-Relationship model is one
of the most popular DBMS conceptual models. An entity is a class of real-world objects
to be described in the database, and a relationship is a set of modeling associations
between two or more entities. The logical model describes the data and the relationships
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between data in a DBMS. During logical design, the conceptual entities and relationships
are translated into a logical schema, i.e. a data schema. The data schema describes the
data and the relationships according to the logical model. The logical model includes
relational model, network model and hierarchical model, managed by the DBMS
technology. The Data Definition Language (DDL), Data Manipulation Language (DML)
and Query Language (QL) are the languages available in a DBMS. DDL is the Structured
Query Language (SQL) construct used to define data in the database. DDL supports the
definition of the logical database schema. DML is the SQL construct used to manipulate
the data in the database. DML and QL support the operations on data that includes data
retrieval, insertion, deletion and update. The typical architecture of a DBMS is shown in
Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 shows the essential parts of a DBMS. The modules of Figure 2.1
correspond to DDL compilation, DML language processing, database querying, database
management and file management. The database description tables, authorization tables
and concurrent access tables are a set of data to support the functionality of these
modules. The execution o f a DML instruction accesses the database corresponding to a
DBMS procedure. The procedure retrieves data from the database into the application
work area using the retrieval instructions, moves data from a work area into the database
using the insert instructions, modifies the data in the database using the update
instructions, or deletes data from the database using the delete instructions. By
communicating with the authorization tables, the database manager checks the users’ or
programs’ authorizations to data access. Authorized operations are forwarded to the file
manager. The database manager is also responsible for concurrent access management. In
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another word, database manager manages simultaneous access requests on the data by
applications.

Authorization
Tables

U ser queries
►

Application

DML
processing,
d atab a se
querying

—►

Workstation Programs (DML)

DDL
instructions
Compilation

D atabase
j
M anagement
System

File
M anagem ent
System

D atabase

D atabase — ►
description
tables

Workstation

Concurrent
a c c e ss
tables

Figure 2.1 Database Management System Architecture

Many modem systems use a client-server architecture. Users work with a PC
(client) and communicate with a large central computer (server). An assortment of
network software is the third component, allowing communication between the client and
the server. Most current database systems also utilize a client-server architecture. In the
simplest client/server architecture, the entire DBMS is contained on the server. The client
sends the requests to the server (the DBMS) for execution. The requests from the client to
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the server are represented by SQL language in a relational system. After the processing,
The database server then sends the answer, in the form of a table or relation, back to the
client.

2.1.2 Data Description Levels
The data description levels of a DBMS include the conceptual level, the internal
level and the external level.
•

The conceptual level is referred to as the conceptual or logical database. It is located
between the other two levels. It consists of the abstract representation of the database
which is independent from the physical implementation.

• The internal level is referred to as the physical database or internal database that is the
implementation of the logical database. The physical database consists of physical
files. It is concerned with data types, data lengths, record formats, storage structures,
and access methods. It represents the database as actually stored and retrieved.
• The external level is referred to as the external database. It is concerned with the
views created from the logical database by users. Each view consists of some entities
and attributes of the logical database.
The logical independence o f data and the physical independence o f data are
supported by the above three levels allowed by a DBMS in the description o f data [3],
Logical data independence means that the application programs which operate on the
logical schema are unaffected when the changes are made to the logical schema. In this
case modifications of the logical schema correspond to redefining the relationship
between the logical schema and the logical views of the applications. Physical data
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independence means that the applications working on the data are unaffected when the
changes are made to the physical data. The physical structures for the data storage can be
modified without affecting the structure of the logical data schema.
A model of the database is the most important part of the design of a DBMS. It is
also known as a data model and is used for modeling a logical database. There are many
data models proposed and available in the literature, such as the entity-relationship model
[10], the network model [21], the hierarchical model [21], etc. The most popular data
storage model in DBMSs is the relational database. The reason for using the relational
model is that they provide high independence of the physical structures of data.
Additionally, unlike the hierarchical and network models, the relational model is flexible
in that it allows a variety o f operations and queries that are not bound to the underlying
physical features.

2.2

Database Security
In database environments, the different users of an organization work on a unique

integrated set of data through the DBMS for the different applications. The same tables
may be referred by different applications. On one hand, this solves such problems as
duplication, data inconsistency, or dependence between the programs and the data
structures; on the other hand, the issues of security threats are increasingly a matter of
concern to such an organization.

2.2.1 Security Problems in Databases
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Violations to database security consist o f improper accesses, modifications or

deletions of data. The violations can be classified into three categories.
•

Improper release o f information: This is caused by intentional or accidental access of
information by improper users. For example, unauthorized information is inferred
through the authorized observation of data.

•

Improper modification o f data: This involves all violations to the data integrity
through improper data handling or modifications. The tampered data may or may not
be read. So, the improper modifications do not necessarily relate to unauthorized
reading.

•

Denial o f service: These involve the actions that could prevent the users from
accessing the database or using resources.
According to the way they can occur, the security violations can also be grouped

into non-fraudulent (accidental) threats and fraudulent (intentional) threats [20].
Non-ffaudulent threats are the damage caused by accidents. These threats involve:
•

Natural or accidental disasters'. These accidents can damage the system hardware
and the stored data of the database system, for example, earthquakes, storm, water
damage or fire. They always cause a data integrity violation or failure of service
access.

•

Errors or bugs in hardware or software: This may cause the unauthorized access,
reading or modification of data, or the failure of access to the authorized users. This
could cause some serious problem which waste a lot of time and resources. This
could also cause weakness that hostile agents could take advantage of.
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•

Human errors: This causes unintentional violations such as the incorrect
understanding or incorrect use of applications. This may lead to incorrect application
of security policies.
Fraudulent or intentional threats are the damage caused by an explicit and

determined fraudulent. Violations involve two classes of user:
•

Hostile agents, improper users (outside and inside) breaking into system and
executing damage to the software and/or system hardware, improperly accessing or
modifying data. For example, all kinds of viruses, Trojan Horses and trapdoors are
attacks of hostile agents.

•

Authorized users who can abuse their rights, privileges and authority to cause a
security breach.

2.2.2 Database Security Protection Requirements
Protecting a database from possible threats means protecting the resources and the
stored data from accidental or intentional unauthorized access and/or modification. The
goal for every database is to make it available and useful to all the users who need that
information. On the other hand, an organization needs to ensure that this same valuable
data is not exposed to unauthorized individuals or corrupted by hostile parties. If the
correct balance between security concerns is not met, not all users that could benefit from
the information will have access to it. Although the security concerns for a database are
the same as those for any other information system, integrity, access control,
authorization, privacy, and confidentiality, database systems present some unique and
challenging issues [14].
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•

Integrity: The integrity includes the integrity of the database, the operational integrity
of data and the semantic integrity of data. Working with the database environment to
achieve high quality is complicated by the processing needs, distance from sources,
and different requirements of database users.
The integrity o f the database concerns database protection from unauthorized access
that could modify the contents of data, and database protection from viruses, sabotage,
errors, or failures in the system. In case of failure, the state of the database may no
longer be consistent. To preserve database consistency, we require that each
transaction should terminate correctly and be able to modify the accessed data; or to
terminate unsuccessfully and not be able to modify the accessed data. Backup and
recovery procedures are widely used in DBMS. Basically, the recovery system reads a
log file to determine the set of transactions need to be undone and the set of
transactions which need to be redone. To undo (rollback) a transaction that has not
been committed means to copy the old value of each operation back to the involved
record. To redo a transaction that has been committed in the log means to copy the
new value o f each operation in the record.
Operational integrity o f data is to ensure the logical consistency of data in a database
during concurrent transactions. Lock and unlock techniques are commonly used to
solve the problem o f ensuring that the concurrent access to the same data item by
different transactions does not cause data inconsistency [3]. A transaction can lock a
data item and make the data inaccessible to other transactions. The item is accessible
again when the transaction has been completed and the locking is released.
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Semantic integrity o f data is to ensure the logical consistency of modified data by
controlling data values in the allowed range. This includes the conditions for the whole
database which are used to set up the correct state of a database and the conditions for
transactions which need to be verified when executing a modification action to the
database.
Authorization: This includes the authentication of the user at log-on time and the use
o f authorization to protect database objects. Passwords can be used to distinguish
various types of access (full, read-only, etc.), and need to be kept in an encrypted file.
The authorization of objects includes the schema level (internal, conceptual, external)
to be protected, the granularity of protection and the method of protection, such as
protection through views, triggers, and stored procedures.
Inference: Inference denotes the possibility of obtaining confidential information
through access of non-confidential data. In statistical databases, users must be
prevented from tracking back to information on individual entities through the
statistical aggregated information.
Access control: Access control for a database containing mixed data consists primarily
o f protecting the confidentiality of sensitive data. Identifying and implementing an
access control policy for a database involves a number of unique challenges. Access
control allows access only to authorized users who are granted a set of privileges on
the sensitive data and prevented from propagating their privileges. Access requests
have to be checked by the DBMS against the user’s or application’s authorization.
Also, access controls need to apply to objects, such as records, attributes and values.

• Confinement: Confinement is needed to avoid undesired information transfer between
system programs, in another word, transfer of the critical data into unauthorized
program.

2.3 Secure Database
An overall view o f the architecture of a DBMS including security features appears
in Figure 2.2 [22].
After user login and authentication, each subsequent access query to the database
which is made through an application program is mediated by the Authorization System
procedures. The Authorization System procedures consult the authorization rules to check
query compatibility with these rules. The access is allowed if the query and the rules
match. If the query and the rules do not match, an error message will be sent to the user
and the violation will be registered in a log file together with date, time and user
references by the Authorization System. The Security Administrator (authorizer), who
defines access authorizations and/or security axioms through DDL or DML language, is
responsible for defining the authorization rules derived from the security requirements of
the organization. The auditor's responsibility is to detect possible suspect behaviors or to
verify recurring types o f violations and periodically examine the log file. The authorizer
may be the same as the Auditor. The Database Administrator (DBA) is responsible for
managing the conceptual schemas, logical schemas and internal schemas of the database.
The secure DBMS module manages all the queries. It includes Authorization rules
and Security axioms. The authorization rules are used for discretionary controls and the
security axioms are used for mandatory controls. One, or both, is used by the
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Authorization System depending on the system protection requirements. The same
module includes Database schemas, which are the protected-objects such as views,
logical schemas and internal schemas.
Through the Transaction manager, authorized access queries are translated into
program calls from the library of Application programs. Then, the authorized access
i

queries are transformed into data access requests through the Data manager. The
Application manager is responsible for the development and maintenance of the library
programs such as PL/SQL library programs in the Oracle database system.
The control of file access can be achieved through the Operating System and
hardware to ensure the data is exclusively transferred into the work area of a requesting
user. Cryptography-techniques and backup copies are the usual means for protecting the
physical stored data and the stored programs.

2.4 Database Security Controls
Access control, flow control, and inference control are three database security
controls. Database protection can be obtained through the security measures for these three
controls.
•

Access control.
In the database systems, access controls are responsible for ensuring that all direct

accesses to the system objects must follow the rules and procedures based on the
protection policies. These rules are information stored in the system, stating the access
mode to be followed by subjects upon access to the objects. The set of control procedures
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checks the access requests (queries) against the stated rules and determines the validation
of the queries. Queries may be allowed, denied, or modified.
The access control system is shown in Figure 2.3. In a closed system, only
explicitly authorized accesses are allowed. In an open system, accesses are allowed if
they are not explicitly forbidden. In a closed system, the minimum privilege policy is
enforced, whereas, in an open system, maximized sharing is enforced. In a security
system, the definition o f ‘who’ can grant or revoke access rights is a relevant procedure.
Grant and revocation are not always the prerogative of an authorizer or of a single
security officer. Typically, in distributed systems, the authorization management is
decentralized to different authorizers. Each is managed by a local Database Administrator
(DBA).
Access control for multilevel system can be either mandatory or discretionary.
Mandatory access controls restrict the access of subjects to objects based on the security
labels. Mandatory controls prevent information flow towards objects of a lower
classification. Through the definition of subject and object security classes, a mandatory
control determines the access to data. The mandatory access control is shown in Figure
2.4. Discretionary access controls allow access rights to be propagated from one object to
another. The discretionary access control requires that the authorization rule should be
defined to specify the privileges owned on the system objects. Access checked by the
discretionary control is granted only to subjects for which an authorization rule exists and
is verified. The discretionary access control is shown in Figure 2.5.
•

Flow control:
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When a statement reads values from X and writes values into Y, a flow between
object X and object Y occurs. A typical example of information flow is copying data
from object X to object Y. The user could get data indirectly in object Y what he cannot
get directly from object X. In another case, when part of the data in X is moved to Y, as
a result, the information about the data in X is provided even if the data is not exactly
data contained in X. This can lead to the secrecy violation. Moreover, a flow violation
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occurs via a transfer request for data. The transfer occurs between two objects on the
admitted flows, but the transfer is unauthorized. Flow control should efficiently deny the
execution o f this kind of requests.
The operations that are defined by the flow control policies allow transfer of
objects to low levels, while keeping the sensitivity of data in these objects to be
unaltered. Higher-class objects are more protected during ‘read’ access than lower-class
objects. Flow controls prevent violations like information being transferred to the lower
levels since the low levels are more accessible levels. Transfer to higher levels is allowed
since the higher levels are more protected levels.
•

Inference control.
Inference controls are to protect data from indirect detection. An inference

channel is a channel where a set of data items in X to be read by a user can be used to
obtain the set of data items in Y by applying a function/to X: Y = / (X).
One main inference channel in a database is indirect access. Suppose an
unauthorized user is not authorized to access data in X. But he can succeed to know the
set o f data items in X through a query on the set of data on Y, which he has rights to
access, and undergoing conditions on Y. For example,
SELECT

X

INSERT INTO

FROM

R WHERE

R (X ) WHERE

Y = <value>

Y = <value>

The data items in X, which is not visible to the user, can be read or modified through the
data items in Y, which is visible to the user. Indirect access can be viewed as a flow
violation, and the flow controls can sometimes be included in inference control.
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Another main inference channel is correlated data. For example, t and Y are
visible and X is invisible. The data X can be inferred from the existing arithmetical
relation: X = t x Y. Here, the invisible data X is semantically connected to visible data Y.
Inference control can be considered as decreasing the uncertainty degree about a data
value and increasing the authorized requests.
The third main inference channel is missing data. Users can come to know the set
of data items X which is not visible to him through the missing data. For example,
SELECT

X, Y FROM

r

WHERE

Y = NULL;

Through the authorized information and the null values which mask the sensitive
inaccessible data, the user’s query about the relation can display the data set X which he
has no authority to access. These null values make it possible to infer the existence of the
masked item value.
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Chapter 3
Designing Database Security
3.1

Secure DBMS Design
A database is a collection o f data that are organized and managed by a DBMS

(Database Management System) [21J. Database security is achieved through a set of
mechanisms at both the DBMS level and operating system (OS) level. It has been shown
that the OS level’s management functions and shared resources management are very
useful to the security in DBMS environment. But the DBMS level has its own security
concerns which are different from the OS level [24].
•

Data life cycle. Data in a database system usually has a long life cycle since the
application may last for many years. The DBMS must protect the data throughout the
whole life cycle o f the data.

•

Logical and physical objects. A database has logical objects and physical objects. The
logical objects in a database include views, relations, keys, etc. The physical objects
in a database include data files, data blocks, memory, processes etc. The DBMS
logical objects are independent of OS physical objects. So, the security mechanisms
in DBMS must protect both the database logical objects and the database physical
objects.

•

Dynamic and static objects. Logical objects in databases can be dynamically created
and may not have corresponding physical objects. For example, the query results are
different for different queries. Views are dynamically created from the base tables.
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The virtual relations are derived from the base relations, which are actually stored in
the databases. Physical objects, which are managed by the OS, are static. The security
mechanisms in DBMS must specifically protect the database dynamic and static
objects.
• Metadata. In a database, there is a “metadata” object that provides information about
the structure of the data in the database. For example, in relational database, the
metadata object describes the relationships between entities, the domains of attributes,
the storage of the tables, the constraints of the table, etc. In fact, the metadata has the
sensitive and important information such as relationships and data types of the
database contents and can be used as a method for controlling access to the
underlying data. In a database, the metadata is stored in data dictionaries, which are
tables that are different from the application tables. The metadata object should be
protected in the same way as the usual data is.
• Semantic correlation among data. In a database, data has semantics and data is
related with other data through the semantic relationships. The security mechanism in
a DBMS should avoid the security violations which are related to the semantic
correlation among objects. For example, the inference threats are related to semantic
relationships. In a statistical database, users must be prevented from inferring
individual data items from aggregated statistical data obtained through statistical
queries.
•

Multiple data types. Databases are characterized by a variety of data types. So, in a
DBMS, multiple access modes are required. For example, these can include
administrative mode, statistical mode, etc. In relational databases, access modes are
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expressed in terms of the basic SQL statements such as SELECT, DELETE, INSERT
and UPDATE. There are only physical access modes for read, write and execute
operations at the OS level.
•

Multilevel transaction. In a database, transactions may involve data at different
security levels. The DBMS security mechanism must avoid security violations in
these multilevel transactions. For example, the data may flow from the high security
level to the low security level. This action might cause a security violation.

•

Object granularity. The granularity of objects in a DBMS is finer than the granularity
o f objects in an OS. For example, the granularity of objects in a DBMS include the
database, collection of relations, one relation, some rows of one relation, some
columns of one relation, etc. A finer granularity for data sharing is also required at
DBMS level. The DBMS must ensure the access controls at various degree of
granularity.

•

Multilevel protection. The DBMS should enforce multilevel protection, in that
different security labels can be assigned to data items in the same object. For
example, in relational databases, a relation has a security label and contains attributes
which have their own security labels. The mechanisms need to define the security
labels and to assign the security labels to the objects and subjects.

3.2

Security Models in DBMS
Security models in DBMS can be broadly classified in two categories: the

discretionary model and the mandatory model.
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Discretionary security models allow users to grant other users authorizations to
access the objects. The creator of an object is allowed to grant and revoke other users’
access and privileges to the object created. Discretionary security models govern the
access o f users to the information on the basis of the users’ identity and on the basis of
rules that specify the types o f access that the user is allowed for the objects.
Mandatory security models govern the access to the information by the
individuals on the basis of the classifications of subjects and objects in the database
system. Objects are the passive entities that store information of the database, such as
data files, tables, records, fields, columns, etc. Subjects are the active entities that access
the objects. If the relationship is satisfied between the classifications of the subject and
object depending on the access mode, the access of a subject to an object is granted.

3.2.1 Elements of DBMS Security Models
The elements of a DBMS security model are shown in Figure 3.1 [22],
•

Subjects. Subjects can be considered to be active processes operating on behalf of a
user. These are the active entities of the system that request access to the objects.
Subjects represent possible threats to the data security. The access requests must be
verified in order to ensure they match the security requirements of the database.

•

Objects. Objects contain information to be protected from unauthorized accesses or
unauthorized modifications. Objects include the physical tables, rows, columns, data
dictionaries, etc.
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Figure 3.1 Elements of DBMS Security Models

•

Access modes. The execution o f an access mode causes a data information flow from
the object to the subject and vice versa. Access modes are the types of access through
which the subjects access the objects.
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•

Policies. These are the rules based on which accesses are managed. They are the
security requirements of the database.

•

Authorization. The authorization state includes the set of rights and privileges that the
users have for accessing and working on the objects of the database system.

•

Administrative rights. The privileges such as grant, revoke and own allow the
modification of the authorizations. For example, in discretionary systems, subjects’
administrative rights enable them to grant the rights/privileges to other subjects and
revoke the rights/privileges from other subjects.

•

Axioms. These are properties that must be satisfied in the system. Axioms state
conditions which must be satisfied by the authorization state. A modification to the
authorization state such as subjects, objects or authorization through the
administrative privileges is only allowed if the resulting authorization state still
satisfies the axioms.

3.2.2 The Wood Model
This model, proposed by Wood et al. [22], is oriented to authorization
management and access control in multilevel-schema databases. This is a discretionary
model. The model uses a three-level architecture for databases. The three levels are the
external level, the conceptual level and the internal level. According to this architecture, a
database is characterized by an internal schema, a conceptual schema, and a number of
external schemas. Each o f the schemas may be based on a different data model and
specify a number of object types.
•

Architecture o f model
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Based on a three-level view of the database, the architecture of the Wood model has
the following three levels:
(1) The external level: This level is the closest to the users and represents the users’ view
on the database. Users’ requests to access the objects of external schema are
translated into the operations on objects of the conceptual level and internal level.
(2) The conceptual level: This level represents the structure of the data stored in the
database. Multiple external objects may be supported by one conceptual object.
(3) The internal level: This is the nearest level to the physical storage. This is the lowest
level o f the representation o f the data stored in the physical database.
Figure 3.2 shows a three-level database architecture of the Wood model. According to
this architecture, there are several external schemas, a conceptual schema and an internal
schema in a database. The Wood model considers a relational database for the external
level and an entity-relational model for the conceptual level. It pays more attention to the
consistency among the authorization rules at the different levels and on the validation of
access requests based on these rules.
•

Subjects:
The subjects in the model are the users who access the database system. There are

two distinguished types of users in this model. One is the authorizers who are responsible
for administering the authorizations such as granting the access rights on the database
objects to the users and revoking the access rights on the database objects from the users.
Another is the users who access the system based on their access rights which are granted
by the authorizers.
•

Objects:
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The objects in this model include the conceptual-level objects and the external-level
objects. Each object o in the system has a type category. The possible type categories at
the conceptual level include attribute, entity and relationship between the different entity
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sets. The relationship type is a bi-directional relationship type between two entities. For
each direction, the relationship has its own meaningful name. The type categories at the
external level are table/view and field/column. The tables can be described in terms of
conceptual-level objects.
•

Access modes:
There are two access modes in this model, one is the conceptual-level access

modes and another is the external-level access modes. A set A of access modes is defined
for each type category.
(1) Conceptual-level access modes:
Aenllly = {insert, delete};
Aanribule = {update, read, use};
A r e h tio n =

{insert, delete, use}.

For all conceptual-level type category C, the access modes Ac are:
C = {entity, attribute, relation}
A = Anu,y u Attribute u Aia,ion= {^sert, delete, update, read, use}
(2) External-level access modes:
Abie/vie*= {insert, delete};
Aetd/coiun,^ {update, read, use};
For all external-level objects E, the access modes Ae are:
E = {table, column}
A = Atabieiview u Aeidiciumn = {insert, delete, update, read, use}
•

Access rules:
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The authorizations are described by access rules which are 4-tuples of the form
(s,o ,t,p ). The access rule <s,o ,t,p ) means that the subject s can execute the access mode
t on the object o under conditions expressed by predicate p. Since the conceptual level
provides a global view of the database structure, the basic access rules should be defined
at this level. These access rules can be transformed into the access rules on the externallevel objects. The authorizer of the external object has the authorization to specify the
access types for one specific object by accepting the conceptual-level rules and by
defining some new or more restrictive rules. For example, a table definition includes the
access constraints which define the access rights for each external-level table and field.
These constraints are stored in an Access Constraint table (AC). An example of an AC
table is illustrated in Table 3.1. The AC table has two columns, one is the external objects
O and another is access types T.

o
EMPLOYEE
EMPLOYEE
EMPLOYEE.name
EMPLOYEE,ssn
EMPLOYEE.manager
EMPLOYEE.salary
EMPLOYEE.manager
EMPLOYEE.salary

T
delete
insert
read
read
read
read
update
update

Table 3.1 An example of an Access Constraint (AC) Table

The access rules for the conceptual level are stored in the Conceptual Rules (CR)
table.

<sc,oc,tc,p c> is defined for the entity sets, attributes and relationships. An

example o f CR table is illustrated in Table 3.2. The access rules for the external level are
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stored in the External Rules (ER) table. <se,oe,te,p e) is defined for tables and fields. The
access type specified in the external rule for an external object must be one of the
allowable accesses to that object specified in table AC. The access rules in external level
must be consistent with underlying conceptual-level rules.

Jones
Jones
Jones
Jones
Jones

EMPLOYEE.name
EMPLOYEE.ssn
EMPLOYEE.manager
EMPLOYEE.salary
EMPLOYEE.salary

Tc
read
read
read
read
update

Smith
Smith

EMPLOYEE.name
EMPLOYEE.ssn

read
read

Pc
-

-

-

-

where
EMPLOYEE.manager^
Jones
-

-

Table 3.2 An example o f a Conceptual Rules (CR) Table
•

Access control:
An access request submitted by a user is checked against the external-level rules.

If the request matches a rule in the external-level rules, the access control process
continues. Otherwise, the process terminates. To restrict the user access only to the
occurrences o f the objects which satisfied both the predicate given by the user and the
predicate stated in the access rules, the external-level rule predicate is appended via the
AND operator to the query. Then, the modified request on the external object is
transformed into the operation on the underlying conceptual objects. The operation and
objects are modified by the restricting operations with the predicates in the conceptual
level. Figure 3.3 illustrates the access control steps in the Wood model.
For example:
Manager Jones wants to update Bob’s salary to $40,000. The request can be expressed as:
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<S, O, T, P> = <Jones, Employee.salary, Update, where Employee.name = ‘Bob’>
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External-Level rules

Y es

____________ I____________
Determine intersection between the
predicate given by the user and the
predicate in the rule

I
Substitute new predicate to the predicate in the
request and transform the modified request
into operation on underlying conceptual objects

Deny ^
A ccess

^-"Restrict operations w ith \.
predicates in c o n c e p tu a l-le v e f^ X
rules

Conceptual-Level
rules

Y es

I __
OUTPUT:
operation on
conceptual objects

Figure 3.3 Access Control Steps in The Wood Model
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t;

S'
Jones
Jones
Jones
Jones
Jones

O'
EMPLOYEE.name
EMPLOYEE.name
EMPLOYEE.manager
EMPLOYEE.salary
EMPLOYEE.salary

read
update
read
read
update

Jones
Jones
Smith
Smith

EMPLOYEE.ssn
EMPLOYEE.ssn
EMPLOYEE.name
EMPLOYEE.ssn

read
update
read
read

P'
-

-

-

-

Where EMPLOYEE.name
o EMPLOYEE.manager
AND EMPLOYEE.name
o Jones
-

-

-

-

Table 3.3 An example of an External Rules (ER) Table

First, the system checks the <S, O, T, P> in the ER table (Table 3.3). If T = Te exists in
the ER table where S e is Jones and Oe is EMPLOYEE.salary, the access control
processing will continue. Otherwise, the access will be denied. The predicate for S e
(Jones), Oe (EMPLOYEE.salary) and Te (Update) is ‘where EMPLOYEE.name o
EMPLOYEE.manager AND EMPLOYEE.name o Jones’ in this ER table because Jones
should not be able to update the salary for herself and for her managers. Then, the system
checks the modified <S, O, T, P> in the CR table (Table 3.2). Here, the modified
predicate

is

‘where

EMPLOYEE.name o

EMPLOYEE.name

o

EMPLOYEE.manager

AND

Jones AND EMPLOYEE.name = Bob’. In the CR table, there is

a predicate, “where EMPLOYEE.manager = Jones”, where S c is Jones, 0 C is
EMPLOYEE.salary
EMPLOYEE.name o

and

Tc

is

Update.

So,

the

new

predicate

EMPLOYEE.manager AND EMPLOYEE.name o

is

‘where

Jones AND

EMPLOYEE.name = Bob AND EMPLOYEE.manager = Jones’. Since Jones submits the
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request to update employee Bob’s salary, the modified predicate is satisfied. After this
access control is processed, Jones can perform the update action on the database objects Bob’s salary,

3.2.3 The Dion Model
The Dion (1981) model [23] proposes a mandatory model that protects the
secrecy o f data as well as the integrity o f data. This model does not allow the information
transfer from the objects to the subjects through the operations such as write. The
information flow is only allowed between the objects, not allowed between the objects
and subjects. In this model, all accesses satisfying the mandatory policy are considered
authorized. This model is based on a classification of subjects and objects which include
both security and integrity levels. Security and integrity are expressed as a set of rules.
A classification (C) and a set o f categories (S) define each security level. The
classification includes Top Secret (TS), Secret (S), Confidential (C) and unclassified (U).
They are ordered: TS > S > C > U. The elements of a set of categories depend on the
database system and the application. A security level I, = (C j,Sj) is higher or equal to
security levelZ2 = (C2,S 2), i.e. SL( I , ) > SL( L2) if and only if the following
relationships are valid: Ct > C2 and Sj 3 S 2.
Each'integrity level also consists of two elements: a classification (C) and a set o f
categories (S). The classification consists of Crucial (C), Very Important (VI) and
Important (I). They are ordered: C > VI > I. The elements of a set of categories depend
on the database system and the application. A integrity level Lx = (C, ,S j) is higher or
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equal to integrity level L2 = (C2,S 2), i.e. IL( Z,) > IL( L2) if and only if the following
relationships are valid: Cj > C2 and S ] ^ S 2.
•

Subjects:
The subjects in the Dion model are considered as the programs which execute in

the system and the acting on behalf of users. Each system subject is assigned three
security levels and three integrity levels. The security level assigned to a subject reflects
the subject’s trustworthiness not to disclose the sensitive information to individuals who
do not have the appropriate security level. A subject can access the system at any level
dominated by its security level. The following three security levels are assigned to each
subject and the following security relationship must be satisfied for each subject:
RSL(j ) > ASLO) > WSL(s)
(1) Absolute Security Level (ASL): This security level is assigned to the subject when it
is created or executed. This level stays throughout the whole life cycle of the subject.
More specifically, this level is the security level of the user whom the subject is
acting for.
(2) Read Security Level (RSL): This is the highest level. The subject is allowed to read if
the Read Security Level is assigned to the subject.
(3) Write Security Level (WSL): This level is the lowest level. The subject is allowed to
write if the Write Security Level is assigned to the subject.
Each subject in the system is assigned an integrity level. The integrity level assigned
to a subject reflects the subject’s trustworthiness for inserting, modifying or deleting
information. The following three integrity levels are assigned to each subject and the
following integrity relationship must be satisfied for each subject:

37

WIL(j) > AIL(r) > RIL(5)
(1) Absolute Integrity Level (AIL): This integrity level stays throughout the whole life
cycle o f the subject. This level is the integrity level of the user for whom the subject
is acting. This integrity level is assigned to the subject when it is created or executed.
(2) Read Integrity Level (RIL): The subject is allowed to read if the Read Integrity Level
is assigned to the subject. This level is the lowest integrity level.
(3) Write Integrity Level (WIL): The subject is allowed to write if the Write Integrity
Level is assigned to the subject. This level is the highest integrity level.
A subject can be trusted from the viewpoint of security and integrity, depending on the
number o f strictly satisfied inequalities. For a subject, if at least one of above inequalities
is satisfied, the subject is said to be trusted. The subject is said to be untrusted if the
above four relationships are satisfied by equality for the subject.
•

Objects:
In this model, the data storage entities are considered to be the objects. Each

object is assigned three security levels and three integrity levels. The security level of an
object reflects the sensitivity of the information stored therein and the potential damage
which could result from unauthorized disclosure of information. The following three
security levels are assigned to each object and the following security relationship must be
satisfied for each object:
MSL(o) > ASL(o) > CSL(o)
(1) Absolute Security Level (ASL): This level stays throughout the whole life cycle of
the object. More specifically, this level is the security level of the data which is
contained in the object.
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(2) Migration Security Level (MSL): This is the highest security level. The data in the
object is allowed to flow to this level.
(3) Corruption Security Level (CSL): This level is the lowest level. The data is allowed
to flow into the object from this level.
Each object in the system is assigned an integrity level. The integrity level assigned to an
object reflects the degree o f trust that can be placed in the information stored in the
object. It also reflects the potential damage that could result from unauthorized
modification of the information. The following three integrity levels are assigned to each
object and the following integrity relationship must be satisfied for each object:
CIL(o) > AIL(o) > MIL(o)
(1) Absolute Integrity Level (AIL): This integrity level stays throughout the whole life
cycle of the object. More specifically, this level is the integrity level of the data which
is contained in the object.
(2) Migration Integrity Level (MIL): The data in the object is allowed to flow to this
level. This level is the lowest integrity level of an object.
(3) Corruption Integrity Level (CIL): The data is allowed to flow into the object from this
level. This level is the highest integrity level of an object.
•

Axioms:

The request by subject s to establish a connection between object Ox and object 0 2 is
granted only if the levels of the subject and objects satisfy the restrictions stated in the
axioms of the model. The axioms in the Dion model include:
(1) Migration property: The information in object Ox is written into object 0 2 . The
migration levels o f 0 2 must be at least as restrictive as the migration level of Ox.
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MSL( Ox) > MSL( 0 2 ), MIL( 0 2 ) > MIL( Ot ).
If the migration property were not satisfied, data in object 0\ would be allowed to
migrate improperly to the security levels, which are not allowed, through the
mediation o f object 0 2 .
(2) Corruption property: The information in object Ox is written into object 0 2 . The
corruption levels of Ox must be at least as restrictive as the corruption level of 0 2 .
CSL( O ,) > CSL( 0 2), C IL(02) > C IL (0j).
If this corruption property were not satisfied, data, which should not be allowed to
flow into object 0 2 , would be able to flow into object 0 2 through the mediation of
object 0 \ .
(3) Security property: For the object Ox from which the information is read, the subject
requesting a connection must have read access to the object Ox, i.e. the Read Security
Level (RSL) must have been assigned to the subject. For the object 0 2 to which the
information is written, the subject requesting a connection must have write access to
the object 0 2 , i.e. the Write Security Level (WSL) must have been assigned to the
subject. The ‘Read Security Level’ of the subject making a connection dominates the
‘Absolute Security Level’ of the object from which the information is read. The
‘Absolute Security Level’ o f the object to which the information is written dominate
the ‘Write Security Level’ o f the subject making a connection.
RSL(S) > ASL( Ox), ASL( 0 2) > WSL(S).

40

This Security property ensures that a subject can only read the objects whose security
level is dominated by the level of the subject. It also ensures that a subject can only
write objects whose security level dominates the security level of the subject.
(4) Integrity property: For the object Ox from which the information is read, the subject
establishing a connection must have read access to the object 0 \ . For the object 0 2
to which the information is written, the subject establishing a connection must have
write access to the object 0 2 . The ‘Absolute Integrity Level’ of the object from
which the information flow dominates the ‘Read Integrity Level’ of the subject
requesting a connection. The ‘Write Integrity Level’ of the subject requesting a
connection dominates the ‘Absolute Integrity Level’ of the object to which the
information is transferred.
AIL( Ox) > RIL(S), WIL(S) > AIL( 0 2).
This Integrity property ensures that a subject can only read the objects whose
integrity level dominates the level of the subject. It also ensures that a subject can
only write objects whose integrity level is dominated by the integrity level of the
subject.
(5) Write/corruption property: The information is written to object 0 2 . The ‘Absolute
Security Level” o f the subject establishing a connection dominates the ‘Corruption
Security Level’ o f object 0 2. The ‘Corruption Integrity Level’ of object 0 2
dominates the ‘Absolute Integrity Level” of the subject establishing a connection.
ASL(S)>CSL(02), C IL (02) >AIL(S).
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This property ensures the satisfaction of the corruption level of the object 0 2 to
which the data is written with respect to the subject making the connection. It derives
directly from the above definitions.
(6) Read/migration property: The information is read from object 0 \ . The ‘Migration
Security Level’ of object Ox dominates the ‘Absolute Security Level” of the subject
making a connection. The ‘Absolute Integrity Level” of the subject making a
connection

dominates

the

‘Migration

Integrity

Level’

of

object

0 \.

MSL(0!):>ASL(S), aIL(S) > M IL (0,).
This property ensures the satisfaction of the migration level of the object 0\ from
which the data is read with respect to the subject making the connection. It derives
directly from the above definitions.
For example:
Subject Sbj wants to insert the data, which is in table Obj\, into table Obj2.
The Read Security Level for Sbj : classification - Secret (Sj,
The Absolute Security Level for S b j: classification - Secret (S),
The Write Security Level for S b j: classification - Confidential (C),
The Write Integrity Level for S b j: classification - Crucial (C),
The Absolute Integrity Level for S b j: classification - Very Important (VI),
The Read Integrity Level for Sbj : classification - Important (I),
A set o f categories for S b j: C{, C2, C3, Cs .
The Migration Security Level for Objx: classification - Top Secret (TS),
The Absolute Security Level for Obj^: classification - Confidential (C),
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The Corruption Security Level for Obj, : classification - Confidential (C),

The Corruption Integrity Level for Obj\ : classification - Very Important (VI),
The Absolute Integrity Level for Obj, : classification - Important (I),
The Migration Integrity Level for Obj, : classification - Important (I),
A set of categories for Obj,: C ,, C2, C3, Cg.
The Migration Security Level for Obj2: classification - Secret (S),
The Absolute Security Level for Obj2: classification - Secret (S),
The Corruption Security Level for Obj2: classification - Unclassified (U),
The Corruption Integrity Level for Obj2: classification - Crucial (C),
The Absolute Integrity Level for Obj2: classification - Very Important (VI),
The Migration Integrity Level for Obj2: classification - Very Important (VI),
A set of categories for Obj2: C ,, C2, C3, Cg.
From the above, we can see the following relationships are satisfied:
RSL( S b j) > ASL( S b j) > WSL( S b j) , WIL( S b j) > AIL(S b j) > RIL(S b j).
MSL( Obj\ ) > ASL( Objx) > CSL( Objx), CIL( Obj\) > AlL(O bj\) > MIL
M SL(Obj2) > ASL(Obj2) > CSL(Obj2), CIL(Obj2) > A lL(O bj2) > MIL(Obj2).
From the above, we can see the following relationships satisfy the Migration property
axioms: MSL( Obj\ ) > MSL( Obj2), MIL( Obj2) > MIL( Obj,).
From the above, we can see the following relationships satisfy the Corruption property
axioms: CSL( Objx) > CSL( Obj2), CIL( Obj2) > CIL( Obj, ).

From the above, we can see the following relationships satisfy the Security property
axioms: RSL( S b j) > ASL( Obj,), ASL( Obj2) > WSL( S b j).
From the above, we can see the following relationships satisfy the Integrity property
axioms: AIL( Obj,) > RIL( S b j), WIL(-Sbj) > AIL( Obj2).
From the above, we can see the following relationships satisfy the Write/corruption
property axioms: ASL( S b j) > CSL( Obj2), CIL( Obj2) > AIL( S b j).
From the above, we can see the following relationships satisfy the Read/migration
property axioms: MSL( Obj,) > ASL( S b j), AIL( S b j) > MIL( Obj,).
Therefore, subject Sbj can insert the data, which is in table Obj,, into table Obj2.

3.2.4 The RBAC96 Model
In role-based access control (RBAC), permissions are associated with roles, and
users are made members o f appropriate roles thereby acquiring the roles’
permissions[12]. Roles are created for the various job functions in an organization. Users
are assigned the roles based on their responsibilities and qualifications. Users can be
reassigned from one role to another. Roles can be granted new permissions as new
applications and systems are incorporated, and permissions can be revoked from roles as
needed. Figure 3.4 illustrates the most general RBAC96 model[12],
In figure 3.4, a single headed arrow indicates a one to one relationship. A double
headed arrow indicates a many to many relationship. The top half of the figure includes
the roles and permissions in the system that controls the access to the data and the access
to the resources. The bottom half includes the administrative roles and the administrative
permissions.
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RBAC96 is based on five sets of entities which are users (U), roles (R),
permissions (P), their administrative counterparts called administrative roles (AR), and
administrative permissions (AP). The administrative roles are disjoint from the regular
(i.e., non-administrative) roles. The administrative permissions are disjoint from the
regular permissions.- Regular permissions can only be assigned to regular roles and
administrative permissions can only be assigned to administrative roles. Intuitively, a
user is a human being or an organization. A role is a job function or job title within the
organization regarding the authority and responsibility. A permission is an approval of
the access mode to one or more objects in the system. The user assignment (UA) and
permission assignment (PA) and administrative permission assignment (APA) relations
o f Figure 3.4 are many-to-many relationships, as indicated by double-headed arrow. A
user can be a member of many roles, and a role can have many different users. Also, a
role can have permissions, and the same permission can be assigned to manydifferent
roles. There is a role hierarchy RH written as >. For example, x > y means that role x
inherits the permissions which are assigned to role y. In another words, a user who is a
member o f x is also a member o f y. For x > y, x is senior to y, i.e., y is junior to x. There
is similarly a partially ordered administrative role hierarchy ARH.
The RBAC96 model has the following components [12]:
•

U is users set;

•

R are roles set and AR are administrative roles set;

•

P are permissions set and AP are administrative permissions set;

•

UA c U x ( R u AR ), is a many-to-many user to role relation, and many-to-many
user to administrative role relation;
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•

PA c P x R many-to-many permission to role assignment relations, and APA c AP
x AR are many-to-many administrative permission to administrative role assignment
relations;

•

RH cz R x R are role hierarchies, and ARH c AR x AR are administrative role
hierarchies;

PA
RH
Permission
Assignm ent

Role Hierachy

P E R M IS S IO N S

R O LES
UA
User
Assignm ent

Sessions

C O N S T R A IN T S
USERS

user
roles

UA
U ser
Assignm ent

AR
A D M IN IS T R A T IV E
R O LES
ARH

AP

APA
Administrative
Perm ission
Assignm ent

Administrative
Role
Hierarchy

Figure 3.4 The RBAC96 Model
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A D M IN .
P E R M IS S IO N S

•

S is sessions set;

•

user: S -> U, is a function mapping from each session S , to the single user
user(S ,). The relation is constant during the session’s lifetime;

•

roles: is a function mapping each session S , to a set of roles and function mapping
each session S , to a set of administrative roles;

•

There is a collection o f constraints forcing which action of the various above
components are allowed or forbidden.
Each session in figure 3.4 relates one user to possibly many roles. Intuitively, a

user establishes a session and activates some roles that he/she is a member of. The
double-headed arrows from a session to R and AR indicate that multiple roles and
administrative roles can be activated at the same time. The permissions available to the
user are the union of permission from all roles which are activated in that session. Each
session is associated with a single user, as indicated by the single-headed arrow from the
session to U. A session is a unit o f access control, and a user may have multiple sessions
with different permissions active at the same time.
Figure 3.4 shows a collection of constraints. Constraints can be applied to any of
the preceding components. An example of constraints is mutually disjoint roles, such as
purchasing manager and accounts payable manager, where the both roles can not be
assigned to the same user.
Role-based access control has recently received considerable attention as a
promising alternative to the traditional discretionary and mandatory access controls
[12]. It greatly simplifies the management of permissions. It manages the access control
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in a DBMS through the role hierarchy, user hierarchy, and user-role relationship. The
RBAC96 model can be used in conjunction with other traditional discretionary and
mandatory security models in a DBMS. The RBAC96 model is readily implemented in
existing database systems such as Oracle.

3.3

The Architecture of Secure DBMSs
Secure DBMSs operate according to two possible modes, one is ‘system high’

mode and another is ‘multilevel’ mode. In the ‘system high’ DBMSs, all the users are
responsible for reviewing the data before properly releasing them. The users in this
system are cleared to the highest security level, i.e. the highest clearance level. This mode
allows the users to use the existing DBMS technologies without applying any changes,
but it takes additional costs on the user-clearance procedure and the manual review of the
data. In an Oracle database system, a more desirable mode, ‘multilevel mode’, is used.
With ‘multilevel’ mode, the different types o f architectures are based on the use of
trusted DBMSs and untrusted DBMSs. The multilevel architectures include the Trusted
Subject Architecture and Woods Hole Architecture. A trusted DBMS and a trusted OS are
used in the Trusted Subject Architecture. The Trusted Subject Architecture requires the
extension of the security features of an existing DBMS or the development of a new
DMBS from the scratch. In the Woods Hole Architecture, an untrusted DBMS is applied
with an additional trusted features added into the system. The Kemelized architecture that
Oracle systems currently utilize is one of the Woods Hole Architecture.
The Kemelized architecture is shown in Figure 3.5. A set of trusted front-ends is used to
interface users with different clearances, shown as High and Low in the Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5 The Kemelized Architecture

A DBMS level, High and Low, is defined. The High level dominates the Low level. The
users who operate at the High level interact with a High DBMS through a Trusted FrontEnd (TFE). The users who operate at the Low level interact with a Low DBMS through a
Trusted Front-End. The TFE acts as a reference monitor, that is, it cannot be bypassed.
The TFE is responsible for enforcing the security functions and multilevel protection.
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Then, users’ requests are passed to the underlying operating system.

Here, a trusted

operating system is used, which is responsible for performing the physical accesses to the
data in the database, and for enforcing the mandatory protection of the physical datafiles.
The trusted OS retrieves the proper data from the underlying database. It performs the
security controls on the database objects. The multilevel decomposition and recovery
processes, which must be properly defined to ensure the correctness and system
efficiency, are required in this architecture. The decomposition process transforms a
multilevel relation into several single level relations. Each single relation contains only
the data which are at a given security level and are stored in the operating system objects.
The recovery process generates a multilevel view that contains the data the user requests
through query. This process is performed on the single-level relations when they are
retrieved.

50

Chapter 4
A Real Case: Oracle Security Database Implementation
4.1

Oracle and Security
As a Database Administrator working on an Oracle Database Management

System in a software company, I feel that database security is essential to ensure system
continuity and reliability and to protect the data and programs from intrusions,
modifications, theft and unauthorized disclosure. 70 percent of database failure reports
are due to the serious failure o f security, including the denial-of-service attacks and the
theft of proprietary information from outside the system. At the same time, the security
threats from inside the company are also growing. According to Information Security's
2000 Industry Survey, the number of companies experiencing the insider access controlrelated breaches increased by 12 percent from 1999 to 2000. The inappropriately
configured database and hosting operating systems become the targets for attackers.
Misconfigured database access controls also make the proprietary information accessible
to unauthorized company employees, resulting in the loss or disclosure o f valuable
information [16].
We need to build a secure Oracle database to ensure:
•

Secrecy and confidentiality: Data should not be disclosed to anyone who is not

authorized to access it.
•

Accuracy, integrity and authenticity: Data can not be maliciously or accidentally

modified or corrupted. The origin of the data needs to be verified when needed.
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•

Availability and recoverability: The system can not be interrupted and data can

be recovered completely with no loss of accuracy and integrity in case of damage.
Creating and enforcing security procedures helps to protect data what is rapidly
becoming the most important corporate asset. There are all kinds of potential intruders
who might want to access a database because they perceive that the data in the database
are valuable to them. While storing that data in a database makes it more useful and
available company wide, it also makes it susceptible to unauthorized access. Such
unauthorized access attempts must be detected and prevented before the database is
compromised.
The Oracle DBMS, a product of the Oracle corporation, is available for several
operating systems, such as UNIX and Window NT. The UNIX version and Window NT
version o f Oracle have been certified at different security levels. Oracle has a multi
layered security model. It can protect the files and objects both inside and outside the
database. It also can incorporate a variety of administrative policies and technical
strategies. The layers of security that we can implement in an Oracle database system
include the following:
•

Controlling the access to the database;

•

Controlling the access to the database tables through the views, triggers, roles,
privileges, packages/procedures/functions;

•

Controlling the access to the operating system files which make of the Oracle
database;

•

Protecting the application codes which interact with the database;

•

Ensuring sufficient backup and recovery of the database.
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Oracle makes several levels of security available to the Database Administrator
which are the account security for validation of users, the access security for the database
objects, and the system-level security for managing the global privileges. Oracle also has
the ability to perform auditing at each level.
Oracle corporation releases new security patches quiteoften. Inresponse to the
growing need for database security, Oracle corporation continues to apply therobustness
and functionality of the security features in the database packages. The security features
in Oracle have matured as new product versions are released. From simple password
protection in Oracle 7, Oracle has expended the security offerings and functionality with
each release [16]:
• Oracle 7.1 added password encryption for security over the network.
• Oracle 7.2.3 added network encryption via a production called Secure Network
Services (SNS).
• Oracle 8 added protection of password-cracking detection, account locking and strong
password enforcement.
• Oracle 8i has gone even further in securing the database for the global community.
•

Oracle9i minimizes the risk with unique, multi-layer security such as the access
control to data at a granular or row level, ensuring the data confidentiality and
integrity across the network, etc.

4.2
•

Security in an Oracle System

Subjects:
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In Oracle, subjects are users and user groups who want to query the database.
Oracle provides the CREATE USER command for creating the users, ALTER USER
command for altering the users, and DROP USER command for deleting the users from
the system. Using the IDENTIFIED B Y clause of the corresponding SQL command, the
administrator

can

choose

between

password-based

and

operating-system-based

authorization of users. Through the special ADMIN OPTION command, a database
administrator can grant system privileges to users who, in turn, can grant such privileges
to other users. In Oracle, a role can be granted to other roles, making a hierarchical
organization of privileges/roles. This role organization is similar to the organization of
user groups. The SET ROLE statement is used to assign a role to an application, which is
enabled via password. Users have default roles which are active at login time. Three basic
privileges are defined as Connect, Resource, and DBA. The Connect privilege allows
users to connect to the database, and to access the database objects, and to update the
tables to which they have access rights. The Resource privilege allows users to create
tables, and to grant access on the tables to other users. The DBA privilege is the highest
privilege of the database that has all privileges including creating user accounts, creating
roles, granting roles, granting privileges, etc. Sys, System and Public are three special
accounts that are installed within the Oracle system. Sys and System have the DBA
privilege. Public corresponds to the basic group of Oracle, and all the privileges that are
granted to Public are automatically granted to all other user accounts.
•

Objects:
The Objects that need to be protected are database objects. These objects in

Oracle include databases, catalogues, tables, views, procedures, function, package, etc.
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•

Operations:

For Operations, the SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, ALTER, INDEX and
REFERENCE privileges are available on tables. But only SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE
and DELETE are available on views. The EXECUTE privilege is available for
procedures. The SELECT privilege is available for Sequences. The GRANT OPTION is
applied to enable the granted users to transfer the acquired privileges to other users. Only
some DBMS servers provide this functionality, and the Oracle server provides it. The
column-level control is supported through the UPDATE, INSERT and REFERENCE
privileges. The AUDIT command of Oracle is used by the Database Administrator to
audit operations that are related to the privilege, both successful and unsuccessful access
statements, and the objects. Audit records can be stored in either a database or in the
operating system audit trail.

4.2.1 Oracle System Files and Database Objects
The components o f an Oracle database system can be divided into two main areas
- .Oracle operating system files (the physical entities) and Oracle database objects (the
logical entities). In our company, we currently use a Windows NT version of Oracle. The
physical files should be protected in the operating system level. Window NT's
weaknesses also affect the Oracle security performance. For example, the Oracle's media
failure, which causes the database to go down, is related to Window NT. But, Database
Scanner provides extensive OS-level checks on file permissions. Furthermore, the DBA
can set up the roles/privileges and create the view/triggers within the framework of
Oracle to ensure the security o f the database from the logical entity level.
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4.2.1.1 Oracle System Files
The following files are significant from a security view. It is very important that
we can protect these files to the full extent allowed by the system.
Figure 4.1 shows the components of an Oracle database system after startup.
•

The physical files that make up the database tablespaces: These physical files include
the control file, redo log files, archive log files, datafiles containing data, datafiles
containing indexes, datafiles for making the rollback segments, and datafiles for
making the temporary segments.
The files that are used for creating the tablespaces can be placed on the computer’s
storage disks. But, file protection should prevent any user except the Database
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Figure 4.1 Components o f the Database System After Startup
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Administrator (DBA) from ever being able to access and manipulate these files
directly from the operating system level. Modification of these files is the sole
responsibility of the Oracle processes. From a security view, maintaining tablespace
security is the access control of the files on the operating system level. The
underlying files for making the tablespaces must be owned by the account that is used
to install Oracle software usually named ‘oracle’.
Redo log files are a set o f binary storage file that is used to keep track of all changes
made to the database. At least two online redo logs are associated with each database.
Only one redo log or redo log group is in use at a time. The online redo logs are
written and reused in a circular fashion. After each redo log file is filled, an archive
log file is created with a copy of the filled redo log file. These archive log files are the
companion files to the redo log files. The archive log files are sequentially numbered
so that the old archive log file will not be overwritten by the new archive log file.
Redo logs are primarily used for database recovery from a disk crash. In the event
that the database was corrupted or damaged because of a malicious action or a breakin action, the database can be restored using the redo logs and archive redo logs to
bring the database back to a good state prior to the corruption. Redo logs and archive
logs coupled with scheduled file-level backups could recover the database and bail us
out of a disaster situation.
The redo log files are created and owned by the Oracle system account and should
never be made accessible to any other user for any purpose. From a security view, it
is better to use redo log groups rather than a single set of redo log files in the database
system. For example,
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CREATE DATABASE sample_dbl
DATAFILE m:/oracle/database/sample_dbl/data/user data.dbf SIZE 50M reuse
CONTROLFILE REUSE
LOGFILE GROUP 1 (M:/oracle/database/logfile/sample_dbl JogO la.dbf
H:/oracle/database/logfile/sample_dbl JogOlb.dbf) SIZE 10M,
LOGFILE GROUP 2 (M:/oracle/database/logfile/sample_dbl JogO la.dbf
H./oracle/database/logfile/sampledblJog02b.dbj) SIZE 10M,
LOGFILE GROUP 3 (M:/oracle/database/logfile/sample_dbllog03a.dbf
H:/ oracle/dataabseflogfile/sample _dbl Jog03b.dbf) SIZE 10M,
MAXDATAFILES 300;
In the above example, there are three sets or groups of redo logs with two members
each on two separate disks M and H. The files sample d b lJo g O la .d b f and
sample_dbl JogO lb.dbf will be written on disks M and H respectively. At switch
time, both sample_db 1_log02a.dbf and sam plejdbl log02b.dbf files will be opened
for writing. By creating the log files in the set of files, preferably on two or more
different disks, if one member o f a set is damaged, the other member of the set will be
available to use for quick database recovery. In our company, we recently
restructured the redo logs and adopted using redo log groups instead o f the old only
one file defined for each redo log.
•

The initialization parameter file: This file with the name INlT<database_sid> ORA
contains Oracle’s initialization parameters. There is no information in the initial file
that can be accessed by the users except the DBA, so it should be protected the same
way as the other datafiles so that the users can not read it. The initialization file can
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only be modified and maintained by the DBA and should be available only through
the Oracle system account. A wise DBA should always insert an entry in the bottom
o f the file reflecting each change that has been made to this file in order for the
database maintenance.
• Control files'. The information in the control file is very important for the operating
and recovery of the database. The database can not start up without the control file.
The control files, like other Oracle files, should never be available to any user and
must be owned by the Oracle install user. Each database has at least two control files
located on different disks, and preferably more copies. The information in all of the
copies is identical and the copies are placed in the different directories on the
different disks. If one of these control files on a system becomes damaged and the
database can not start up, when the specific damaged control file is determined, we
can replace the damaged control file with one of the other copies of the control file
from a different disk and then restart the database.
•

The configuration file : The file named as CONFIG. ORA contains the configuration
information about the database. This file includes the information of the database
name, the location o f the control files, the location of the dump files and the database
block size, etc. This file can only be modified and maintained by the DBA through
the oracle installation account and should be available only to the oracle system
account.

•

Network configuration files: These files include LISTERNER.ORA, TNSNAMES.ORA
and SQLNET.ORA. These files are used for the connection between client’s
workstations and the database server.
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•

The Oracle distribution files: These files include the code for building, connecting
and maintaining the Oracle databases. Some usernames and passwords are embedded
in the Oracle distribution files. The users are prevented from accessing and modifying
these system files.

4.2.-1.2 Oracle Database Objects
Within the database, we can grant the users access to the Oracle database objects
or revoke the users access from the Oracle database objects such as tables and views.
There are different levels and forms of access to the data within the database tables. We
can control the access by creating views and only granting the selected users the access
rights to the views instead o f granting the selected users access to all underlying tables.
Also, we can create triggers and procedures to perform the actions behind the scenes to
control the security and protect the data in the database.
•

Tables: Tables are basic building blocks used to store data in the database. A table is
a file that is created and maintained with the data files. The user who creates a table
usually owns that table. Users can access another user’s table only if the owner of the
table or a DBA grants the privileges on the table to them. The privileges on these
tables can be granted directly to the users, to a special user named ‘public’, or to a
role.
The privileges on table level include SELECT, DELETE, UPDATE and INSERT. We
can also grant the privileges on a column of one table to users. The privileges on
column level also include SELECT, DELETE, UPDATE and INSERT. For security
and monitoring purpose, tables are preferably created with extra fields to capture the
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username, the time of creating the data, and modification action performed. In our
database for each database table, we require to have four common fields to capture
the creation action and modification action information of a table. These four fields
are

CREATEDJBY,

DATETIME CREATED,

M O D IF Y B Y

and

DA TETIME_MODIFY.
• Views: Within an Oracle database, views are used to enable a subset of information to
be extracted from a table or from several tables. Views can be used for several
security purposes. For example, views can control user access by pre-joining tables to
limit the data they can retrieve. When the view is created, its definition specifies the
column to be retrieved from the tables. This approach provides column-level security.
We can grant access rights on the views to selected users instead of granting full
access on the tables to selected users.
Figure 4.2 shows how a user would access the view and how execution of the view
causes required data to be retrieved from several tables.
•

Triggers: Triggers are stored programs associated with a table. A trigger is fired
either before or after an event which is the set of commands that performs INSERT,
DELETE, or UPDATE actions. From a security standpoint, triggers are very useful to
track activities that change the data and prevent the unauthorized access to the data.

•

Stored programs: The stored programs written in PL/SQL can be stored in a
compiled form within the database. There are two types of stored programs which are
the procedures and functions. For ease in maintenance, the schema owner owns all
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stored programs. Users or applications can execute stored programs if the EXECUTE
permission on the program has been granted to the users.
Triggers or stored procedures can populate another table with information based on
the action being taken on the primary table. They also can remove information from
another table based on the action being taken on the primary table. Triggers or stored
procedures capture information about the data before the data is modified. They can
issue an alert to let someone know a table has been modified. Through views,
triggers, and stored procedures, we can control the user access to a table.
When we deliver our application code outside of our own company, it is
recommended to run the PL/SQL Wrapper utility, so that the readable ASCII text
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source code can be converted into unreadable code. Then the unreadable code can be
delivered to anywhere in the Oracle database and its contents are secured.
•

Synonyms: The synonym is an alias name of an object. A synonym is used in an
Oracle database to provide the location transparency of objects and object owners. By
using the synonyms, the user not only does not have to know who actually owns the
table, but also does not have to know in which database the table is located. The use
of synonyms helps to hide the underlying database structure. This also helps to
protect the database from curious or malicious break-in actions.

4.2.2 Oracle Data Dictionary
Oracle’s data dictionary consists of two layers which are the tables that make up
the real data dictionary, and a series of views that allow us to access the information in
the data dictionary. Oracle’s data dictionary includes all database objects regardless of
who owns the objects. Users are only allowed to look at the data in the data dictionary
based on their job requirements. Users can only see the information which is appropriate
for their level o f privilege. The privileges granted to the users on the data dictionary
views are different from the privileges granted to the underlying tables. The data
dictionary views include the views showing the data about a user’s own objects labeled
“U SE R J\ the views showing the data available to any user in the database are labeled
“ALL_”, and the views showing the data available to only the Database Administrator
labeled “D B A ”. Different users with different privileges can access the different objects.
Table 4.1 lists some important views for the Oracle database security [4].
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A user granted the DBA role can access and possibly modify any objects within
the database. Some of the dictionary views can only be accessed by the users with DBA

View Name

Type o f Information Available

DBAPROFILES

Profiles and their associated
resource and time limits
All roles that exist in the
database
Roles granted to users and other
roles
System privileges granted to
users and roles
Privileges like SELECT,
INSERT, UPDATE, etc. that
each user or role has per object
Who has an account for the
database; also, which profile is
assigned to the user
Roles granted to roles

D B A RO LES
DB A R O L E P R I V S
DB A S Y S P R I V S
DB A T A B P R I V S

DB AUSER S

ROLE_ROLE_PRIVS
ROLE_SYS_PRTVS

System privileges granted to
roles

R O L T A B P R I VS

Table privileges granted to roles

US ER R O L EPR IV S

Roles granted to the current user

Tables on Which View Is
Built
profile$, profnameS,
resouce map, objS
user$
user$, sysauthS, defroleS
user$, sysauthS,
system_privilege map
user$, objauthS, obj$,
table_privilege_map
user$, ts$, profnameS,
profiles, user_astatus_map
userS, sysauthS
userS,
system_privilege_map,
sysauthS
userS, table_provilege_map,
objauthS, objS, col$
userS, sysauthS, defroleS,
and xSkzdos

Table 4.1 Oracle Database Data Dictionary Views

privileges. When we described the view DBA_USERS, ALLJJSERS, and USERJUSERS,
we can see a different number o f columns and different column information for each
view:
SQL> desc all users;
Name
USERNAME
USERID
CREATED

Null?
NOTNULL
NOT NULL
NOTNULL
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Type
VARCHAR2(30)
NUMBER
DATE

SQL> desc dbausers;
Name
USERNAME
USERID
PASSWORD
ACCOUNTJSTATUS
LOCK DATE
EXPIRY DA TE
DEFA ULTTABLESPACE
TEMPORARYTABLESPACE
CREATED
PROFILE
EXTERNAL_NAME
SQL> desc user users;
Name
USERNAME
USERID
ACCOUNT STATUS
LOCKDATE
EXPIRY DA TE
DEFA ULTTABLESPA CE
TEMPORARYTABLESPACE
CREATED
EXTERNAL NAME

Null?
NOTNULL
NOTNULL
NOTNULL
NOTNULL
NOTNULL
NOTNULL
NOTNULL

Null?
NOTNULL
NOTNULL
NOTNULL
NOTNULL
NOTNULL
NOTNULL

Type
VARCHAR2 (30)
NUMBER
VARCHAR2(30)
VARCHAR2(32)
DATE
DATE
VARCHAR2(30)
VARCHAR2(3 0)
DATE
VARCHAR2(30)
VARCHAR2(4000)

Im .

VARCHAR2(30)
NUMBER
VARCHAR2(32)
DATE
DATE
VARCHAR2(30)
VARCHAR2(30)
DATE
VARCHAR2(4000)

4.2.3 Other Elements of Oracle Security System
The following objects are the logical entities in an Oracle database. Oracle
protects and maintains these entities and uses them to enforce security in the database
system.
•

Users: The Database Administrator is responsible for maintaining the database user
accounts. The DBA creates a user account, assigns a password, defines a default
tablespace/temporary tablespace/quota for the user. The users are granted the
appropriate privileges to connect to a database to perform their work on the database
system. The privileges are granted to users by the DBA based on the user’s required
job responsibilities.
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•

Schema: Schema is the complete collection of objects owned by a user account. The
schema includes the tables, views, sequences, packages, functions, procedures,
triggers, etc.
Only the owner of an object or a user with DBA role can grant the access
privileges to other users for interacting with the objects. DBA should be very careful
when granting the access rights on any objects to any users.

•

Privileges: Privileges include two general categories which are the system privileges
and the object privileges. The access rights for users to log on to the database system
and to create/manipulate the database objects are the system privileges. The access
rights for the user to access the data within a database object, or to allow the user to
execute a stored program are the object privileges. There are more than 80 system
privileges on the Oracle database system. For example, CREATE TABLE, CREATE
SYNONYM, CREATE AN Y VIEWS, CREATE SEQUENCES, etc. There are total of 16
object privileges in an Oracle database. For example, ALTER, AUDIT, SELECT,
UPDATE, EXECUTE, REFERENCES, etc.

•

Roles: A role is a collection of privileges. A role can be assigned to the users. The
function of a role is to allow the group o f privileges to be passed to the users by
referencing the role. If the role’s privileges are changed later, the new privileges will
be in effect when the users log into the database at the next time. Figure 4.3.1 shows
an example of role hierarchical organizations in an Oracle Database System. Figure
4.3.2 shows an example o f an Administrative Role Hierarchy in Oracle Database
System.
Oracle supplies several default roles with the installation of the database. Table 4.2
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shows the major default roles in an Oracle database system.

Role Name

Type o f Privileges

CONNECT

Allows login and ability to create tables, views, synonyms,
and database links.
Add cluster, procedure, and trigger privileges.
Complete authority to manage database and users. Can
create users.
Ability to start up and shut down the database.
All privileges available to the DBA role with the ability to
create, start up, shut down, and recover a database.

RESOURCE
DBA
SYSOPER
SYSDBA

Table 4.2 Oracle Default Roles

□rector (DIR)

Project lead 1 (PL1)

Project Iead2 (PL2)

Quality
Engineer 1
(QE1)

Production

Quality
Engneer2
(QE2)

Production
Engineer 2
(PE2)

B n g n e e rl

(PE1)

Engineer 2 (E2)

Engineer 1 (E1)

Project 2

Project 1
Engineering Department (ED)

Employee (E)

Figure 4.3.1 An Example of Role Hierarchy in Oracle DB System
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Senior Security Officer (SSO)

Department Security Officer (DSO)

Project Security Officer 1
(PSO I)

Project Security Officer 2
(P S 02)

Figure 4.3.2 An Example of Administrative Role Hierarchy in Oracle DB System

•

Profiles: Oracle provides two different types of profiles which are the product
profiles and the system resource profiles. Product profiles limit user access to certain
Oracle commands or Oracle products. System resource profiles limit a particular
user’s use of certain system resources. Using product profiles, we can block users’
access to Oracle’s SQL, SQL*Plus and PL/SQL product.
The PRODUCT PROFILE table provides the mechanism used to block
commands. We can use PRODUCT PROFILE to enforce security. When users log
into the database, the user has minimum privilege directly through SQL*Plus.
However, a user could use the SET ROLE command from SQL*Plus to gain access
privileges normally enabled only when the application is used. Then, the user could
issue SQL statements from SQL*Plus to change database tables which is detrimental
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to the security of the database system. We need to disable the SET ROLE privilege for
the specific users to prevent this damage.
The system resource profile is a set of restrictions or limits that can be placed on
a database resource. These resources include the amount of time which a process can
be idle before the process will be disconnected, the number of failed login attempts
before an account is locked, etc. For example,
CREATE PROFILE dbprofile LIMIT
SESSIONS_PER_ USER 6
CPU PER CALL 3000
CONNECT TIME 60
FAILED_LOGIN_A TTEMPTS 5
PASSWORD LOCK TIME 1/12

4.3

Methodologies of Designing A Secure Oracle Database
Before discussing the methodologies of designing a secure Oracle database, I

would like to mention that the Oracle database management system currently uses the
thin-client architecture. Figure 4.4 shows the three-tier thin client architecture. Using this
architecture, it enables [17]:
•

The Low resources on the client side to have minimal security requirements.

•

The medium amounts of resources on the application server to have higher security
requirements.

•

The High resources requirements for one or more back end servers to have varying
amounts o f security requirements based on the different application which a particular
database supports.
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Network

Network

Client

--------

W orkstation M an a g e r
Display

C lient

___

____

W orkstation M an a g e r
Display
Application S erver
Client

D a ta b a s e S e rv er

—

W o rkstation M a n a g e r
Display

Figure 4.4 The Thin Client Architecture in Oracle DB System

4.3.1 Developing a Database Security Plan
It is very important to create policies and a security plan in securing the database
system. And this is the first step in the secure database system development. Before we
create a database, we need to identify and address all of the necessary issues:
•

Collect and be familiar with all the database requirements and information; set up a
uniform approach to security across the computer systems and databases.

•

Identify all affected applications on each system; determine the access requirements
based on each different application.

•

Identify all o f the key players and the managers in the database and identify the
specific types of accounts for the operating system and database system.

70

There are several different types of Oracle users: Database Administrator and
security manager who is responsible for creating user accounts and monitoring user
access and the database security, application manager who is responsible for
handling the administrative tasks for the specific database in which their application
is housed, network manager who is responsible for administering the network
products and Names Servers and network configurations for Oracle databases,
application schema who is the owner of a specific database and may require more
privileges than a general user, and the general user whose privileges are determined
within the application.
•

Identify the username and password structure in the database system.
The structure includes password aging and expiration, password reuse, failed login
attempts, account locking and unlocking.
Password aging and expiration: To help to ensure that a password will not be
compromised, the password needs to be changed on a system at least every three
months (recommended). The longer a password remains in effect for an account, the
greater the possibility that the password can be compromised.
Password reuse: It is recommended to exclude a password that has been used from
being used by that person again.
Failed login attempts: The numbers of failed login attempts that will be tolerated in a
system should be determined.
Account locking and unlocking: The decision might be made to never enable account
locking or never enable automatic account unlocking. If account locking is going to
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be enabled, we need to define the personnel who will be in charge of performing the
account unlocking.
•

Determine who has the authority to approve the accounts and who is responsible for
creating/dropping/managing accounts.

•

Determine a user tracking system and implementation.
Identify how the users are tracked to ensure that when an employee’sjob description
or location changes, the access to the database remains correct.

•

Establish the standards and structures for the roles, privileges, views, triggers, etc.

•

Determine what constitutes a security breach and the appropriate penalty for each
breach.

•

Identify all sensitive information/data on the database system and define the
methods/steps to protect these data.

•

Determine the types o f monitoring to be used.

•

Determine the types o f backup to be used and define the recovery procedures for the
system.

4.3.2 Developing an Audit Plan
Database auditing is the monitoring and recording of activities occurring within a
database. The audit helps to:
•

Ensure that no unauthorized users can access the tables to which they do not have the
rights to access;

•

Ensure that no unauthorized users can remove data from the data dictionary that they
do not have the privileges to see;
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•

Audit the specific tables that help to determine the volume of access occurring at peak
times.
The audit includes the Security Auditing and the Performance Auditing. The

Security Auditing is to determine if someone is attempting to break into the database
system. When some problem has occurred in the system, this audit helps to determine the
reasons. For example, we found that some data might have been deleted from a table in
which the data should not be dropped. The audit can be used to track the deletions in that
specific table. The Performance Auditing is used to determine the reason why the system
is slow. This audit helps to determine the volume of traffic interacting with the specific
areas o f the database. The audit trail can be written either directly to an operating system
file or to the database. Two parameters in the INIT. ORA file control the auditing actions:
•

AUDIT_FILE_DEST: This parameter tells Oracle the directory name in which the
audit trail is to be written to. The default value for this parameter is
$ORACLE_HOME/RDBMS/A UDIT.

•

AUDIT_TRAIL: This parameter tells Oracle to enable or disable auditing. If the
parameter is set to be NONE, this means that no non-default auditing will occur. If the
parameter that is set to be OS, this means that system-wide auditing will occur and the
results will be written to a file in the directory which is defined through the
AUDIT FILE DEST parameter. If the parameter that is set to be DB, this means that
system-wide auditing will be turned on and the results will be written to a table
SYS.A UD$ in the SYS schema in an unencoded, readable format. Oracle provides
some standard auditing views for performing the auditing in the system. For example,
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DBA_AUDITjONJECT,

DBA AUDIT SESSION,

DBA_AUDIT STATENMENT,

DBA AUDITJTRAIL, DBA_AUD1T ONJECT, AUDIT ACTIONS, etc.
There are three different types of auditing in the Oracle database system which
are statement-level auditing, system-level or privilege auditing, and object-level
auditing.
•

Statement-level auditing: This auditing includes the auditing for Data Definition
Language statements and the auditing for Data Manipulation Language statements.
For example, a statement-level audit can audit any action performed on the tables,
such as CREATE TABLE, ALTER TABLE, DROP TABLE, TRUNCATE TABLE, etc.
If we wanted to capture the number of times the database was accessed but the
attempt to log on failed, we could use the following command:
SQL> A UDIT CONNECT WHENEVER UNSUCCESSFUL;
The summary table for this audit might contain a count, by 24-hour period, of all of
the failed attempts to connect to the database. The hacker’s attempts to guess the
correct password for an account are recorded as unsuccessful logons. A higher than
normal number of failures in the summary table might indicate that someone was
trying to break into the database by guessing account names and passwords. Through
this auditing, we will be able to identify an unauthorized person’s attempts to gain the
access to the database system.

•

Privilege auditing: We can enable the auditing on specific privileges via the AUDIT
command. The monitoring o f who holds which privileges is a manual or automated
task which is performed through SQL code, for example:
SELECT grantee, privilege
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FROM dbajsys_privs
WHERE GENTEE NOT IN ('SYS ", ‘SYSTEM ’, ‘RECOVERY_CATALOG_OWNER’,
TMP_FULL_DA TABASE

‘EXP_FULL_DATABASE',

'DBA',

‘CONNECT’,

‘RESOURCE');
Through this auditing, we can audit who has been granted the specific privileges on
the database. The hacker will have a much harder time to build ‘hidden’ accesses to
the database system.
•

Object-level auditing: Through this audit, we can audit for inserts to a table, updates
to a table, deletions o f rows in a table, or the viewing of information contained in the
table. By using the audit table and creating the ‘before update’ trigger, the appearance
of the data can be effectively captured prior to allowing the changes to occur.
It should be mentioned that for each action being audited, there may be a large

volume o f information generated. If too much is audited, then no one will have time to
look at the generated log files. For this reason, we may need to create a summary table to
separate and/or summarize the information of interest from the total volume of
information collected. By creating a smaller table and populating it with a summary of
information, we accomplish two very important things [25]:
•

We enable removal of information from the underlying SYS.AUD$ audit table to

conserve storage space.
•

We gain easier access to our trending data.

Also, we should protect the audit trail so that audit information cannot be added,
modified, or deleted. We can issue the following command:
AUDIT delete ON sys.audS BY ACCESS;
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To protect the audit trail from unauthorized deletions, only the DBA should have the
DELETE CATALOG ROLE role.

4.3.3 Backing Up and Recovering the Database
Availability is a key tenet of computer security. In every database system, backup
and recovery facilities are integral to keeping the system and data available for use.
Backup and recovery facilities keep a loss from becoming a disaster [11].

4.3.3.1 Backing Up the Database System
There are several different forms of backups that can be performed to ensure the
data is available to the database. These backups include:
•

Cold database backups: This backup is performed when the database is shut down.
The DBA must ensure that no processes are active within the database when the
attempt is made to shut down the database. All files that make up the database are
copied either to another disk or to a tape after the database is shut down. These files
include all datafiles, redo logs, control files, and the INIT.ORA file. Many different
system-dependent utilities can be used to perform the actual backing up of the files.
In our company, we use the Backup Manager to back up the database. We shut down
our databases at 10:00pm every night for performing the backup. After the databases
are backed up successfully, the databases are restarted at 5:00am every morning.
If a disaster occurs, the DBA would first save off the current redo log files and
control files to a separate disk or tape, then restore the files from the backup. After
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this, the DBA would replace the older log files with the current saved redo log files
and roll forward through the archive log files until the point just prior to the disaster.
Hot database backups: The database remains up and running while the hot database
backup is performed. During the hot backups, the datafiles corresponding to the
tablespace are copied to the separate disk or tape as with the cold database backups.
To begin a hot backup o f a tablespace’s datafiles, the following command is issued:
ALTER TABLESPACE <tablespace_name> BEGIN BACKUP-,
Logical database backups: A logical database backup involves reading a set of
database records and writing them to a file. This backup includes a full database
export, an export by user or a full schema export, and an individual table or set of
tables export. To perform an export of a database, the database must be up and
running. When we plan to make a big database change to a schema, we usually export
this schema before making any changes. Using an export file, the database can only
be recovered to the time at which the export was performed. The export files are very
portable and can be used to move or copy a database from one system to another
system.
Between these backups, the off-site tape storage backup (i.e. cold database
backup) is a whole database backup, which performs a backup on all physical files
and all database objects. When the off-site file-level copy is completed, the database
is restarted. When the copy is completed, if a disaster occurs, we can recover all the
files which make up the database from the tape. The database can be recovered to the
condition it was in when the copy was made. When an off-site tape storage is used in
conjunction with archive log files, the database can be recovered to a ‘point in time’.
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Also, we can use the file-level copy on the tape to recover one or more individual
tables.

4.3.3.2

Recovering the Database System

There are several different ways in which a database can be recovered. Generally,
there are two approaches:
•

Recovery from export or file-level backups without the archive logging enabled.

•

Recovery from the file-level backups plus archive logs.
More specifically, there are three basic types of recovery - online block recovery,

thread recovery, and media recovery.
•

Block-level recovery: This recovery is automatically performed by Oracle during
normal operation o f the database. When Oracle detects a corrupted block in the cache,
it attempts to pull the block off disk and recover it using the online log file.

•

Thread recovery: If a database crashes while it has the database open, it is necessary
to do thread recovery. This involves applying to the database all the redo changes in
the thread that have occurred since the last time the thread was checkpointed.

•

Media recovery: It is used to make backup data files current or to restore changes that
were lost when a data file went offline without a checkpoint by Oracle. The database
can not be opened if any o f the online data files needs media recovery. There are
primarily three options we can choose while doing media recovery.
•

Database recovery: This means that we can restore all (or some) data files from

the backup and recover the entire database.
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•

Tablespace recovery: We can perform media recovery on a specific tablespace.

This means all datafiles that belong to the tablespace will be recovered.
•

Data file recovery: we can recover a specific data file while the rest of the

database is in use.
The database recovery can be performed online, i.e. with the database open. The
recovery can also be performed offline, i.e. with the database closed. For an online
recovery, within the database, we can use the commands RECOVER TABLESPACE and
RECOVER DATAFILE. From the outside of the database, we can use the Import utility to
recover the entire database, schema, or tables from an export file. The import include the
full database mode, schema-level mode, and the table or set of tables mode.
For an offline recovery with the database closed, we can recover the system
tablespace as well as an entire database. Using this method, if a tablespace has been
corrupted, the DBA can alter the datafiles with the OFFLINE DROP option and rebuild
the tablespace, and restart the entire database.
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Chapter 5

Conclusions
5.1

Main Results
This project consists o f two parts. The first part is to do some research on the

Database System Security. The second part is to do some research on a real Database
Security System: the Oracle Database Security System.
The DBMS, which is discussed in this project, is based on the relational model,
rather than the network model, the hierarchical model or other models. The relational
model, which provides high independence of the physical structure o f data and allows a
variety of operations and queries that are not bound to the underlying physical features, is
the most up-to-date, popular and useful data model for modeling a database. In Chapter 2,
the concepts o f Database Management System (DBMS), the architecture of a DBMS, the
data description levels o f a DBMS which includes the conceptual level, the internal level
and the external level, and the relational model were briefly discussed. Then, the security
problems in a database and the database security protection requirements were examined.
The access control, the flow control and the inference control were illustrated in this
Chapter since the database protection can be obtained through the security measures for
these three controls. The structure o f a Database Management System including the
security features was also presented in this Chapter.
A DBMS should be designed with security in mind to ensure that the security
features o f a DBMS are considered from the earliest development stages. In Chapter 3,
the concerns and the security measures o f a secure DBMS design were illustrated. The
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basic elements of DBMA security models were presented. Generally, the database
security models are classified into two traditional categories: the discretionary security
models and the mandatory security models. In Chapter 3, we studied The Wood Model,
which is the representative of the discretionary security models, and The Dion Model,
which is the representative of the mandatory security models. A role-based access control
model (RBAC96 Model) which is currently applied in the Oracle database system for the
security control was also presented in detail in this Chapter. The architecture o f a secure
DBMS, specifically the Kemelized architecture which the Oracle database system
currently utilizes, was illustrated here.
In Chapter 4, we studied the Oracle subjects, system files, database objects, data
dictionary and other elements of the Oracle security system, which are significant from a
security view. The basic methodologies of designing a secure Oracle database, which
includes developing a database security plan, developing an audit plan, and developing a
backing up and recovering the database system plan, were discussed and illustrated in this
Chapter. These research results, considered to be valuable and very useful, were adopted
by our company and applied into our current Oracle database system. For example, in our
company, at the beginning stage o f the database system development, a database security
plan is required to be set up based on the security plan checklist that we developed during
work on this research project.

5.2

Future Research Directions
There are some other interesting research topics in the Database Security area, for

example, the application o f computer immune systems to the distributed database
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systems. An immunological model of distributed detection has been designed and
developed for computer security. One of the domains that is suitable to the model of
distributed detection is the distributed database. Consider a database that is distributed
across many locations in a network. These locations can consist of computers connected
in LANs or individual computers. The communication between systems at different
locations may have to pass through multiple intermediate local system. Natural immune
systems protect animals from dangerous foreign pathogens, including bacteria, viruses,
parasites, and toxins. Although there are many differences between the living organisms
and computer systems, the similarities are compelling and could point the way to improve
the computer security. The immune system defends the body against harmful diseases
and infections. To do this, it performs pattern recognition tasks to distinguish molecules
and cells of the body (called “self’) from dangerous foreign ones (called “nonself’), and
then eliminate nonself from the body. The problem of protecting computer database
systems from malicious intrusions can similarly be viewed as the problems of
distinguishing self from nonself. Nonself might be an unauthorized user, foreign code in
the form of a computer virus or worm, unanticipated code in the form of a Trojan horses,
or corrupted data. This is a very interesting and potential research topic in the Database
Security area [19].
There are some other interesting and potential database security research topics
including the design of multilevel secure database systems, the application o f LOCK data
views, etc [1],
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